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Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the 
United States Supreme Court Join the Dialogue? 
Cody Moon 
Traditionally, constitutional courts claim that domestic 
commentaries and the constitutions themselves are the sole bases for 
the analysis and interpretation of their constitutions.1 For example, a 
constitutional court may consider the original meaning of a 
constitution when adopted or it may consider the common 
understanding of the words as used in the present day. As this Note 
will demonstrate, constitutional courts are increasingly looking to 
other constitutional courts’ holdings when interpreting their own 
constitutions. 
Part I of this Note is a general history of constitutional courts. It 
includes a look at the original justification for constitutional courts 
and judicial review. Additionally, Part I demonstrates the rise in 
popularity of constitutional courts and their resultant proliferation 
throughout the world.  
Part II discusses the constitutional courts of Canada, Australia and 
South Africa and analyzes the avenues those courts have taken in 
deciding issues under their constitutions and laws. Part II concludes 
by focusing on the United States Supreme Court’s failure to refer to 
the decisions of other constitutional courts when deciding 
constitutional issues as well as the purported reasons behind the 
Court’s stance. 
Part III provides a comparison and analysis of the approaches to 
comparative constitutional analysis among the selected countries as 
well as their approaches to participation in the comparative 
constitutional dialogue.2 Finally, Part IV proposes that the United 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2003, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 21 (2003). 
 2. For a thorough and informative review of comparative constitutional analysis within 
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States Supreme Court adopt a modified policy of comparative 
constitutional analysis.  
I. HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
While the United States was the first country to practice judicial 
review,3 it is by no means the birthplace of the concept.4 This country 
implemented judicial review against a backdrop of centuries of 
European legal philosophy on the subject.5 Many constitutions have 
drawn on this philosophical tradition by explicitly conferring the 
power of judicial review.6 Hans Kelsen created a constitutional court 
for Austria’s Second Republic when he drafted its 1920 
Constitution.7 Kelsen argued that a legal system needs a constitution 
to serve as the supreme law enforceable only by a “court-like” body.8 
He considered the constitutional court to be “a negative legislator.”9 
Unfortunately for Kelsen, the rise of fascism ensured a short life for 
the Second Republic’s constitutional court and others like it in 
Europe.10 In the years following World War II, however, 
constitutions and constitutional courts quickly spread throughout the 
continent.11  
 
the context of capital punishment, see Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: 
Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).  
 3. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “judicial review” as “1. A court’s power to review the 
actions of other branches or levels of government; esp., the courts’ power to invalidate 
legislative and executive actions as being unconstitutional. 2. The constitutional doctrine 
providing for this power. 3. A court’s review of a lower court’s or an administrative body’s 
factual or legal findings.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (7th ed. 1999). 
 4. MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (1979).  
 5. Id. at 3. The origins of judicial review date back at least as far as Greco-Roman 
civilization. Id. at 5-6. The theory continued to develop during medieval times and throughout 
the English colonial expansion leading up to the eventual creation of the U.S. Constitution. Id. 
at 6-11. 
 6. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (13th ed. 
1997). 
 7. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
EUROPE 34 (2000). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 35. Kelsen defines a “negative legislator” as one who cannot make law freely 
because the decision making is “absolutely determined by the constitution.” Id. 
 10. Id. at 37. Other countries with short-lived interwar constitutional courts include Spain, 
Czechoslovakia and Germany. CAPPELLETTI & COHEN, supra note 4, at 13.  
 
 11. Id. For example, Austria reenacted its 1920 Constitution in 1945. Id. at 14. Italy 
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Unlike most constitutional courts, the United States Supreme 
Court is a self-created constitutional court. In other words, the United 
States Constitution does not explicitly give the Supreme Court the 
power of judicial review.12 Instead, judicial review in the United 
States stems from the Supreme Court decision Marbury v. Madison,13 
in which Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that the Court is 
empowered to strike down any legislation or regulation to the extent 
that it conflicts with the Constitution.14  
As countries around the world grow and develop, new problems 
arise in defining and interpreting their constitutions. With these new 
developments, and with new constitutional courts arriving on the 
 
adopted its Republican Constitution in 1948 and created its Constitutional Court in 1956. Id. 
West Germany adopted the Bonn Constitution, which created a constitutional court, in 1949. Id. 
New constitutions created constitutional courts in the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, and the 
Republic of Turkey in 1961. Id. Japan, with heavy influence from the United States, 
implemented a constitution allowing judicial review in 1947. Id. Yugoslavia became the first 
socialist country to begin to experiment with judicial review in 1963. Id. 
 12. Article III of the United States Constitution established the judicial branch of the 
United States government. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III states that “[t]he judicial Power 
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Id. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction 
includes:  
[A]ll Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens 
of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same 
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
Id. at § 2, cl. 1. Moreover, the Constitution gives Congress the power to alter the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but not its original jurisdiction. Id. at § 2, cl. 2. See also 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332-33 (1816) (holding that Congress does 
not have the power to modify the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). 
 13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 14. Id. at 178. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
[I]f both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must 
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or 
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which 
of these conflicting rules governs the case . . . the constitution . . . must govern the case 
to which they both apply. 
Id. Chief Justice Marshall further noted that “[t]he judicial power of the United States is 
extended to all cases arising under the constitution.” Id. 
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global scene,15 the world’s constitutional courts frequently engage in 
a global dialogue for interpretation of common themes and 
problems.16  
II. RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TRENDS 
A. Australia 
Australia’s Constitution is a product of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act of 1900.17 The Constitution created a 
“Federal Supreme Court” called the High Court of Australia.18 
Originally, the High Court did not have final authority, because its 
decisions were subject to review by the British Privy Council.19 
When Australia and the United Kingdom agreed to end this 
arrangement in 1986,20 the High Court finally became Australia’s 
true court of last resort in all matters.21 
During the High Court’s early years, the Justices relied primarily 
on principles applied in the courts of England.22 As the High Court 
developed it sought independence from England, and established its 
own interpretations of the Australian Constitution.23 The Court relied 
less on English jurisprudence and more on decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court.24 Recently, the High Court has broadened its 
influences. 
 
 15. See, e.g., South Africa’s experience discussed infra note 73. 
 16. See, e.g., infra Part II (discussing courts in Australia, Canada, and South Africa 
engaging a global dialogue in resolving constitutional issues). The idea of judicial comity is not 
new. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has referenced other countries’ legal norms and 
decisions since at least the late 19th Century. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 708-11 (1893); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 167-81 (1895); The Paquete Habana, 
175 U.S. 677, 687-708 (1899). 
 17. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12 (Eng.).  
 18. AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 71. The High Court of Australia was not actually established 
until October, 1903. Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form 
of Ancestor Worship?, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000). 
 19. Michael Kirby, Rules of Appellate Advocacy: An Australian Perspective, 1 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 227, 228 (1999).  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Kirby, supra note 18, at 9. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/11
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This trend can be seen in Mabo v. Queensland [No.2],25 which is 
considered one of the High Court’s most important decisions.26 In 
Mabo, the Court, by a six to one majority, rejected the doctrine of 
terra nullius.27 To support its holding, the Court considered decisions 
from Nigeria,28 Canada,29 India,30 New Zealand,31 the United States,32 
and the International Court of Justice.33 The Court never discussed 
whether the decisions of other judicial bodies should be considered. 
Instead, the Court’s decision demonstrates that the proper way to 
approach the terra nullius issue was to assess similar cases from 
other countries.  
In its references to other common law countries and unapologetic 
use of comparative constitutional analysis, Mabo is a typical High 
Court decision. In Australia Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. 
Commonwealth,34 for example, the High Court looked to decisions 
from Canada, the Queen’s Bench in England, and the United States.35 
In its analysis, the Court did not question the validity of the Solicitor 
General’s use of United States Supreme Court opinions as the sole 
authority supporting of the contention that political advertising by 
political parties and interest groups is a legitimate means of 
conveying relevant information to electors.36 In fact, the High Court 
added credence to the argument by discussing cases from England, 
Canada, and the European Court of Human Rights.37 This is 
 
 25. (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. 
 26. Gary D. Meyers & John Mugambwa, The Mabo Decision: Australian Aboriginal 
Land Rights in Transition, 23 ENVTL. L. 1203, 1204 (1993). 
 27. 175 C.L.R. at 15. Originally, the doctrine of terra nullius was applied by colonial 
powers to take title to newly discovered and uninhabited lands. Meyers & Mugambwa, supra 
note 26, at 1205. However, when Europeans started settling lands that were already occupied, 
the doctrine was expanded to cover lands inhabited by indigenous populations that were thought 
to be too primitive to have an organized society. Id. 
 28. 175 C.L.R. at 14, 48, 82, 85, 124-25. 
 29. Id. at 10, 13-14, 83-84, 89-90, 165-66. 
 30. Id. at 54-55, 123-24. 
 31. Id. at 64, 83, 137. 
 32. Id. at 10, 12-14, 64, 90, 135-36, 164-65. 
 33. Id. at 40. 
 34. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (holding unconstitutional an act allowing the government to 
pass legislation limiting or restricting the freedom of communication and broadcasting rights). 
 35. Id. at 107. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 168-69 nn.82-85 and accompanying text. 
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consistent with the Court’s declaration in Cook v. Cook38 that it 
would continue to look to the courts of other countries for assistance 
and guidance.39 
Like other constitutional courts, the High Court operates 
independently of other branches of government and other nations’ 
judiciaries.40 With its power and vast history, the High Court does not 
need to look to other countries for precedent, but it voluntarily does 
so. The High Court of Australia is truly an active participant in the 
comparative constitutional analysis dialogue. 
B. Canada 
The Canadian Supreme Court is the product of a long internal 
struggle that began when England conquered Canada in 1763 and 
culminated in 1949, when Canada ended all appeals to the British 
Privy Council.41 The Constitution Act of 1982 incorporated the 
British North American Act of 186742 and established the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,43 creating a constitution with supreme 
authority.44 
Partly as a result of its colonial past, Canada’s Supreme Court has, 
since its inception, embraced foreign materials as authority for its 
own decisions.45 The Canadian Supreme Court regularly incorporates 
the opinions of its U.S. counterpart as well as those of other 
 
 38. (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376 (defining the duty of care drivers owe to passengers who know 
the driver to be inexperienced and unqualified). 
 39. Id. at 390. The High Court decided this case after, but during the same year, that 
Australia and England formally ended the appeal to the British Privy Council from Australian 
courts. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.  
 40. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
 41. James F. Smith, Comparing Federal Judicial Review of Administrative Court 
Decisions in the United States and Canada, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 503, 551-552 (2000). See id. at 
545-54 for an in-depth history of the creation and development of the courts including the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
 42. Id. at 553. The British North America Act of 1867 established the Dominion of 
Canada. Id. at 546. The Act incorporated Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario 
into Canada. Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland joined later. Id.. 
 43. Id. at 553. 
 44. Id. at 553 n.423. 
 45. Gérard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L. 
REV. 211, 212-13 (1994). 
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countries’ high courts.46 British and French jurisprudence are also 
frequently used by Canada’s Supreme Court.47 
Three landmark decisions, The Queen v. Keegstra,48 Van der Peet 
v. The Queen,49 and Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees 
Union,50 illustrate the Canadian Supreme Court’s application of 
foreign legal thought. The fact that different justices wrote each of 
these decisions for varied panels further supports the argument that 
comparative constitutional analysis is a norm in Canada.51 
In The Queen v. Keegstra,52 the Court considered whether the 
Canadian criminal code could prohibit hate speech. After examining 
Canadian authority, Chief Justice Dickson’s opinion for the Court 
quickly turned to non-Canadian sources for additional assistance in 
interpreting the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.53 The Chief Justice 
began his comparative constitutional analysis with an examination of 
United States jurisprudence and legal thought.54 He defended the use 
of comparative constitutional analysis by noting the many similarities 
between the Canadian and American approaches to constitutional 
protection of free expression.55 Not only did the Chief Justice 
 
 46. Id. at 212-13.  
 47. Id. at 213. 
 48. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
 49. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
 50. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211. 
 51. The Canadian Supreme Court holds court en banc with a panel of nine judges. 
EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 34 (1986). The Canadian Supreme Court avoids 
sitting with an even number of justices. If one justice is unavailable, then the Court will sit with 
seven justices instead of eight. Mary Ann Glendon, A Beau Mentir Qui Vient De Loin: The 
1988 Canadian Abortion Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 569, 575 
n.16 (1989).  
 52. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. Keegstra, a high school teacher, was convicted of “wilfully 
promoting hatred against an identifiable group by communicating anti-semitic statements to his 
students.” Id. at 698. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the criminal code violation under 
which Keegstra was convicted infringed on his rights under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Id. The Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal. Id.  
 53. Id. at 738. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. Chief Justice Dickson notes:  
[T]hose who attack the constitutionality of s. 319(2) draw heavily on the tenor of First 
Amendment jurisprudence in weighing the competing freedoms and interests in this 
appeal, a reliance which is understandable given the prevalent opinion that the 
criminalization of hate propaganda violates the Bill of Rights. 
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consider the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Beauharnais 
v. Illinois, which upheld a criminal statute prohibiting certain types of 
group defamation,56 he also noted lower court decisions in the United 
States that “distinguished and doubted” Beauharnais.57  
After considering the American decisions, the Chief Justice 
acknowledged that the Canadian Supreme Court could benefit from 
the United States Supreme Court’s 200 years of experience.58 The 
Chief Justice noted the similarities between American and Canadian 
laws, but concluded that important differences exist between 
Canadian and American constitutional perspectives.59  
Beyond comparisons with the United States, the Chief Justice 
considered the effect of international human rights obligations on the 
Court’s interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.60 He also noted that the section of the Canadian criminal 
code in question requires particular deference because many foreign 
democracies have adopted similar provisions.61  
 
Id. Moreover, the Chief Justice notes, “I find it helpful to summarize the American position and 
to determine the extent to which it should influence the s. 1 analysis in the circumstances of this 
appeal.” Id.  
 56. Id. at 739 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)). According to the 
Canadian Supreme Court, the Beauharnais holding now only protects “offensive, public 
invective as long as the speaker has not knowingly lied and there exists no clear and present 
danger of violence or insurrection.” Id. This statement demonstrates the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s willingness to interpret foreign law and draw its own conclusions therefrom.  
 57. Id. at 739. Chief Justice Dickson refers to decisions from the D.C., Seventh and 
Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals as well as the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 740-43. Chief Justice Dickson notes, “Where s. 1 operates to accentuate a 
uniquely Canadian vision of a free and democratic society . . . we must not hesitate to depart 
from the path taken in the United States.” Id. at 743. 
 60. Id. at 749-50. Chief Justice Dickson explains that “international human rights law and 
Canada’s commitments in that area are of particular significance in assessing the importance of 
Parliament’s objective under s. 1.” Id. at 750. He also quotes Justice La Forest: 
While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American 
constitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees 
that have counterparts in the Unites States Constitution, they should be wary of 
drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different countries in 
different ages and in very different circumstances . . . .  
Id. at 740 (quoting R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639). 
 61. Id. at 770.  
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Van der Peet v. The Queen62 addressed the issue of aboriginal 
rights. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Lamer casually 
justified the Court’s use of United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in its interpretation and analysis of the issue.63 He 
reasoned that the value of the United States decisions lay in “their 
articulation of general principles, rather than their specific legal 
holdings.”64  
In addition to United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Van 
der Peet Court also considered cases from the High Court of 
Australia.65 Chief Justice Lamer acknowledged that the High Court 
had yet to rule on the issue before the Court, but nevertheless 
proceeded to adopt Australian concepts on aboriginal land title.66 The 
Court ultimately accepted the American and Australian views in 
upholding the statute at issue as within the limits of the Canadian 
Constitution.67 
In Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union,68 a 
teacher claimed that mandatory check-off clauses in his union’s 
collective bargaining agreement violated his constitutional freedoms 
of association and expression.69 The Canadian Supreme Court held 
that the agreement did not violate any rights guaranteed by the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.70 Lavigne is unique due to the 
structure of the Court’s opinion. The Court heard the case as a panel 
 
 62. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
 63. Id. at 541. Chief Justice Lamer transitions to United States jurisprudence without a 
specific heading in the opinion. Instead, he simply states, “[t]he view of aboriginal rights as 
based in the prior occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal societies, finds support 
in the early American decisions of Marshall C.J.” Id. at 540. 
 64. Id. at 541. Chief Justice Lamer wrote “I agree with Professor Slattery both when he 
describes the Marshall decisions as providing ‘structure and coherence to an untidy and diffuse 
body of customary law based on official practice’ and when he asserts that these decisions are 
‘as relevant to Canada as they are to the United States.’” Id. That the Chief Justice can make 
such a claim unaccompanied by citations to Canadian judicial precedent for incorporating 
foreign jurisprudence illustrates both how commonly the Canadian Supreme Court looks to 
international sources and how accepted the practice is among the Canadian public. 
 65. Id. at 544. 
 66. Id. This is comparative constitutional analysis at its boldest. The Court happily adopts 
a foreign court’s analysis of an issue that the foreign court has failed to resolve. 
 67. Id. at 547, 571-72. 
 68. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211. 
 69. Id. at 211. 
 70. Id. at 212. 
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of seven justices and produced neither a majority nor a dissenting 
opinion. Of the four separate opinions, three expressly incorporated 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.71 Although the seven 
Justices did not fully agree on the issue before the court, all 
acknowledged the relevance of United States Supreme Court 
pronouncements on the issue.72 
C. South Africa 
The South African Constitutional Court is one of the world’s 
youngest constitutional courts.73 However, it has already 
demonstrated its capacity to tackle major issues that have come 
before every established constitutional court.74 In its consideration of 
important constitutional issues, the Constitutional Court does not 
hesitate to look to other constitutional courts for guidance and 
comparison.75 
In State v. Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court used its power 
of judicial review76 to hold the death penalty unconstitutional as cruel 
 
 71. Id. at 218-20. None of the Justices took issue with the reliance on United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Justice Cory, the only Justice not to mention a United States 
Supreme Court case in his opinion, indicated his agreement with Justice Wilson, whose opinion 
incorporates United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. at 230-31, 274-77. 
 72. See supra note 71.  
 73. The current system in South Africa is the result of a very unusual series of events. On 
September 6, 1996, the “Constitutional Court of South Africa . . . declared the constitution of 
South Africa to be unconstitutional.” Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 
28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 695 (1996). Justice Sachs, of the South African 
Constitutional Court, explained in his presentation that South Africa created an “Interim 
Constitution” to serve as law until a new constitution could be drafted. Id. at 696. The Interim 
Constitution contained thirty-four broad principles with which the new constitution would have 
to comply. Id. at 696-97. The Constitutional Court had the job of ensuring the new 
constitution’s compliance with the Interim Constitution. Id. at 697. This enabled the 
Constitutional Court to declare the new constitution unconstitutional. Id. 
 74. See The State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) (holding the death penalty 
unconstitutional); Nat’l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs, 
2000 (2) SALR 1 (CC) (ruling discrimination based on sexual orientation and marital status 
unconstitutional). 
 75. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 73, at 700 (stating that South Africa’s Constitutional Court 
“found the decision of the German Constitutional Court . . . particularly instructive” in 
interpreting the South African Constitution). 
 76. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8, § 167(5) (enabling the Constitutional Court to strike down 
legislation as unconstitutional). 
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and inhumane.77 The Court began its analysis with a thorough 
discussion of United States Supreme Court death penalty rulings.78 
The Court then turned to high court decisions from nearly a dozen 
countries, including Canada,79 Hungary,80 and India.81 The Court also 
considered decisions by the European Court of Human Rights82 and 
the United Nations Committee on Human Rights.83 The Court 
seemed to assume that its expansive comparative constitutional 
analysis was essential to determining the death penalty’s 
constitutionality.  
These decisions appear to illustrate that such comparative 
constitutional analysis is common in the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence. Moreover, the Court does not limit the scope of its 
comparative analysis to just the most familiar, established courts. 
References to the constitutional law of countries like Hungry,84 
Trinidad and Tobago,85 and Namibia86 are also common. 
D. Comparative Constitutional Analysis and the U.S. Supreme Court 
Though it has been reluctant to fully embrace it, the use of 
comparative constitutional analysis is not a new issue to the United 
States Supreme Court. As early as 1893, the Justices debated the 
issue,87 at which point it was the dissenters who decried the practice 
of looking beyond our borders for judicial guidance and assistance.88 
In 1894, in a case dealing with comity between nations in a conflict 
of laws situation, the Court debated the enforceability of foreign 
 
 77. (3) SALR at 413. 
 78. Id. at 415-17, 418, 420, 421-23. 
 79. Id. at 423-24. 
 80. Id. at 429-30. 
 81. Id. at 426-29. 
 82. Id. at 426. 
 83. Id. at 425-26. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 436-38. 
 85. See, e.g., Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security, 1997 (3) SALR 786, 810 (CC). 
 86. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632, 642-43 (CC). 
 87. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737, 757 (1893) (Brewer & Field, 
J.J., dissenting) (rejecting the application of foreign doctrine of inherent sovereignty and noting 
the irrelevance of foreign practices to United States constitutional law). 
 88. Id. 
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judgments in U.S. courts.89 In 1900, the Court held that courts in this 
country are obligated to give effect to certain international laws.90 
Traditionally, however, the United States Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to apply comparative constitutional analysis when 
interpreting the United States Constitution.91 
Currently, the Supreme Court’s most vocal opponent of 
comparative constitutional analysis is Justice Antonin Scalia.92 
Among legal scholars siding with Justice Scalia on this issue, one of 
the more prominent is Bruce Ackerman. Professor Ackerman argues 
that the “spirit of the American Constitution requires limiting the 
scope of inquiry to American sources.”93 
The Court’s leading advocate of incorporating ideas from other 
constitutional courts is Justice Stephen Breyer,94 whose views on the 
subject are generally shared by Justices John Paul Stevens,95 David 
H. Souter,96 and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.97 Justice Sandra Day 
 
 89. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894). 
 90. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900). This decision has never 
been overturned by legislation or by subsequent Supreme Court decision. 
 91. Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Forward, A Judge on Judging: The 
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 114 (2002) (stating that the 
United States Supreme Court makes little use of comparative law). 
 92. In 1997, Justice Scalia wrote, “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a constitution.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).  
 93. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3 (1991). Ackerman writes: 
To discover the Constitution, we must approach it without the assistance of guides 
imported from another time and place. Neither Aristotle nor Cicero, Montesquieu nor 
Locke, Harrington nor Hume, Kant nor Weber will provide the key. Americans have 
borrowed much from such thinkers, but they have also built a genuinely distinctive 
pattern . . . . As we lose sight of these ideals, the organizing patterns of our political 
life unravel. 
Id. at 3-4, 6. 
 94. In his dissenting opinion in Printz, Justice Breyer argues for the use of comparative 
constitutional analysis. 521 U.S. at 976-77. Justice Breyer refers to the Federalist Papers in 
arguing for comparative analysis. Id. at 977. He states, “Of course, we are interpreting our own 
Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural 
differences between their systems and our own. But their experience may nonetheless cast an 
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.” Id. 
 95. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (noting the relevance of 
international views on the death penalty). 
 96. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785-86 (1997) (discussing the approach 
taken to assisted suicide in the Netherlands). 
 97. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Hones Merritt, Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial 
Lecture: Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
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O’Connor has also signaled her willingness to consider, and possibly 
incorporate, foreign jurisprudence under appropriate circumstances.98 
Even Chief Justice William Rehnquist, one of the current Court’s 
more conservative justices, acknowledges that the Court will 
probably look to foreign sources more in the future.99 
Notwithstanding the apparent receptiveness of a majority of today’s 
Court, and despite the efforts of past Justices such as William 
 
253, 282 (1999) (calling comparative analysis “emphatically . . . relevant to the task of 
interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights”). 
 98. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 711 (1998). 
“Following a daylong exchange of views with ECJ [European Court of Justice] members and 
the opportunity to attend a hearing, both Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer noted their 
willingness to consult ECJ decisions ‘and perhaps use them and cite them in future decisions.’” 
Id. See also Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: 
Opening up Conversation on Proportionality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 638-39 (1999). 
Jackson quotes Justice O’Connor: 
I think that I, and the other Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, will find ourselves 
looking more frequently to the decisions of other constitutional courts. Some, like the 
German and Italian courts, have been working since the last world war. They have 
struggled with the same basic constitutional questions that we have: equal protection, 
due process, the rule of law in constitutional democracies. Others, like the South 
African court, are relative newcomers on the scene but have already entrenched 
themselves as guarantors of civil rights. All these courts have something to teach us 
about the civilizing functions of constitutional law. 
Id. (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and 
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 1997 Spring meeting, American College of Trial 
Lawyers, reprinted in 4 INT’L JUDICIAL OBSERVER, June 1997 at 2). 
 99. In 1989, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave a speech at a symposium in connection with the 
40th anniversary of the German Basic Law. In his speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: 
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the power of 
judicial review had no precedents to look to save their own, because our courts alone 
exercised this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts were created 
after the Second World War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, among other sources, for developing their own law. But 
now that constitutional law is solidly ground in so many countries, it is time that the 
United States courts begin looking to the decision of other constitutional courts to aid 
in their own deliberative process. The United States courts, and legal scholarship in 
our country generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and 
decisions of other countries. But I predict that with so many thriving constitutional 
courts in the world today . . . that approach will be changed in the future. 
William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts: Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC 
LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul 
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993). 
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Brennen, Jr.,100 the United States Supreme Court has yet to join the 
global dialogue on comparative constitutional analysis.101  
III. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dube of the Canadian Supreme Court is 
an active contributor to the comparative constitutional analysis 
dialogue. Yet, Justice L’Heureux-Dube warns that courts adopting 
foreign reasoning as their own must take care to avoid the “Pitfalls of 
Globalization”102 arguing that courts should carefully consider the 
context underlying a foreign court’s treatment of a particular issue.103 
The constitutional courts of Australia, Canada, and South Africa 
also actively participate in the global dialogue on comparative 
constitutional analysis. All three of these courts use United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence as a primary guide when interpreting 
their own constitutions and laws.104 This is not surprising considering 
the widespread use of the U.S. Constitution as a Model for other 
nations’ constitutions and judicial systems.105 
An analysis of Canada’s Supreme Court gives valuable insight 
into the global dialogue.106 Canada and the United States have similar 
 
 100. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice Brennan wrote, in dissent, that 
“contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other countries is also of 
relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.” Id. at 389. Justice Brennan argued that since other 
countries have outlawed capital punishment altogether or reserve it for “exceptional crimes,” 
the United States should not allow persons under the age of 18 to be sentenced to death. Id.  
 The idea that the United States Supreme Court should employ foreign sources in its 
analysis has also found favor among many legal scholars. Professor Mark Tushnet notes “I have 
developed the view that the Constitution licenses comparative analysis with respect to both 
federalism and separation of powers. In its narrow version, the argument is that the Constitution 
might sometimes license comparative inquiry when other sources of constitutional 
interpretation run out.” Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1235 (1999). 
 101. See Barak, supra note 91, at 214. 
 102. Claire L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the 
International Impact of Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 26-27 (1998). 
 103. L’Heureux-Dube notes, “Political and social realities, values and traditions differ 
across borders, regions and levels of development. In particular, pressing human rights issues 
often differ significantly from developed to developing countries, and different solutions in 
different places are unquestionably necessary.” Id. 
 104. See generally Part II of this Note, supra. 
 105. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 403, 1116 (2000). 
 
 106. I have chosen to focus on Canada first because its Supreme Court is more established 
than either Australia’s or South Africa’s. In addition, Canada is very open about considering the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/11
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legal systems and social norms.107 Thus, the idea of the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s referral to decisions from the United States 
Supreme Court is understandable.  
In Queen v. Keegstra108 the Supreme Court of Canada undertook a 
thorough analysis of U.S. jurisprudence in considering the 
constitutionality of a Canadian criminal statute. Ultimately, the Court 
found the United States Constitution irrelevant.109 However, the fact 
that the Court discussed U.S. jurisprudence extensively in a case 
where the outcome did not depend on it illustrates how regularly the 
Court utilizes U.S. and other constitutional court jurisprudence when 
interpreting Canada’s constitution. In fact, none of the Justices took 
issue with the Court’s use of comparative constitutional analysis. A 
dissenting opinion referenced U.S. and other international decisions 
and statutes as extensively as the majority did.110 
As an example of the Supreme Court of Canada’s routine 
participation in the comparative constitutional analysis dialogue, 
Keegstra illustrates a pattern. Even in cases where the Court decides 
not to follow other constitutional courts, examples from such courts 
which appear relevant to the Court’s analysis is open to considering. 
Moreover, the Court’s use of comparative constitutional analysis is 
rarely the basis of a dissenting opinion. 
As the youngest court considered in this Note,111 the South 
African Constitutional Court is unique in the wide range of sources it 
considers in its constitutional analyses. The Court looks, whenever 
necessary, to find authority that will help it interpret South Africa’s 
laws and constitution. However, the Court regards foreign decisions 
as merely sources of ideas.112 This is in marked contrast to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s repeated focus on, and remarkable 
 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court when interpreting the Canadian Constitution. 
La Forest, supra note 45, at 213. 
 107. Id. at 212-13. 
 108. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
 109. Id. at 740-41. 
 110. For U.S. jurisprudence, see id. at 812-20. For other international decisions and 
statutes, including the European Commission on Human Rights and U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, see id. at 820-26. 
 111. See supra note 73. 
 112. See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) (holding the death penalty 
unconstitutional despite consulting United States Supreme Court decisions to the contrary). 
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deference to, the pronouncements of a select few outside 
jurisdictions. 
The High Court of Australia’s approach falls somewhere between 
Canada’s and South Africa’s. Like the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
High Court accords great weight to certain foreign authorities.113 But 
like South Africa’s Constitutional Court, the High Court consults a 
fairly broad range of foreign sources.114 The different approaches 
taken by Canada, Australia, and South Africa illustrate the array of 
choices available should the United States Supreme Court choose to 
enter the global dialogue on comparative constitutional analysis. 
As Justice L’Heureux-Dube has recognized,115 comparative 
constitutional analysis continues to proliferate, with countries as 
diverse as Namibia and England increasingly participating in the 
international dialogue.116 Nevertheless, obstacles remain. As a court 
of last resort, the constitutional court of any given country needs to 
maintain uniformity. If a constitutional court considers foreign 
opinions when it decides a case, attorneys in subsequent cases need to 
be able to rely on the continued application of the same rules. But 
 
 113. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
 114. See, e.g., Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth, (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501 (discussing 
decisions from Germany, Israel, New Zealand, and the International Court of Justice). 
 115. Id. at 21. Justice L.’Heureux-Dube states,  
[I]t was appropriate, until recently, to speak of the interaction among judges in 
different places as a process where some courts impacted others. Colonies, countries 
with less developed jurisprudence in areas like human rights, and smaller or 
developing countries all received, through various processes, the jurisprudence and 
approaches of others. 
 Current trends . . . show how dramatically this picture is changing. Rather than a 
one-way transmission, the development of human rights jurisprudence, in particular, is 
increasingly becoming a dialogue. Judges look to a broad spectrum of sources in the 
law of human rights when deciding how to interpret their constitutions and deal with 
new problems. To a greater and greater extent, they are mutually reading and 
discussing each others’ jurisprudence. 
Id.  
 116. L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 102, at 21. In the recent Namibian case of Mwellie v. 
Ministry of Works, [1995] 4 L.R.C. 184, the Constitutional Court considered decisions from 
India, United States, Canada, England, Malaysia and South Africa as well as the European 
Court of Human Rights. Id. In England, a recent decision concerning the Constitution of 
Antigua and Barbuda considered jurisprudence from Canada, the United States, India, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe as well as the European Court of Human Rights and the European 
Commission on Human Rights. Id. at 22. 
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when one constitutional court decides an issue one way and another 
reaches a different conclusion, who determines which court is 
correct? When courts in the United States disagree, the United States 
Supreme Court can decide the issue.117 Once fully immersed in the 
dialogue for comparative constitutional analysis, however, it is no 
longer possible to have a court of last resort because no country 
wants to subordinate its constitutional court to that of some other 
country. Yet, the problem of a split among the constitutional courts 
still exists, and there is no uniform rule to follow.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
For any country, the danger of full immersion into the global 
dialogue of comparative constitutional analysis is that judicial comity 
may one day require the country’s highest court to reach a decision 
that is not in the country’s best interests. Accordingly, the United 
States Supreme Court must be certain of a few things before 
considering or applying a decision from a foreign court. First, the 
basis and reasoning of the foreign decision must be considered in the 
context of the originating country. Additionally, the Court must 
maintain predictability. Any uncertainties introduced by comparative 
constitutional analysis will lead to an increase in the number of cases 
in our already over-burdened legal system. 
Looking beyond the possible “Pitfalls of Globalization”,118 
comparative constitutional analysis offers unique opportunities to 
learn about new methods of analysis and new approaches to issues 
that domestic courts have yet to address. As the world continues to 
modernize, its constitutional courts will increasingly face common 
issues. For example, the internet affects people all over the world. 
Each country must determine for itself the acceptable uses of this 
technology. 
Constitutional courts must determine the appropriate course for 
their respective countries, and how they will interpret their 
constitutions to account for factors that may not have been considered 
when their constitutions were written. These courts must also weigh 
 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 118. L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 102, at 26-27. 
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the impact of their decisions on the rest of the world as well as how 
decisions from other constitutional courts will affect them. 
The internet’s growth has positive aspects as well. Worldwide 
internet access to electronic databases makes foreign decisions 
available to any constitutional court that is interested.119 With easy 
access to foreign decisions, the odds are in favor of increased 
dialogue in comparative constitutional analysis.  
The United States Supreme Court is currently not an active 
participant in the comparative constitutional analysis dialogue.120 In 
order to preserve the nation’s identity and uniqueness, the Court 
should refrain from fully entering the dialogue. Instead, the Court 
should find a balance between adopting a general theory of 
comparative constitutional analysis and avoiding the “Pitfalls of 
Globalization.”121 The best way to achieve this result is to categorize 
a specific issue when the Court first considers it. The Court must 
decide whether a particular issue is something that has a unique 
impact on the United States and its citizens and culture. If the answer 
to this question is yes, then under no circumstances should the Court 
engage in comparative constitutional analysis. However, if the issue 
before the Court is a general issue or one that affects the world as a 
whole, then the Court should proceed with caution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States is a world leader with one of the oldest 
constitutional courts. Its position in the world legal community 
requires the United States Supreme Court to engage in the 
comparative constitutional dialogue. As a leader, the Supreme Court 
can show other constitutional courts that it is within acceptable limits 
to consider the opinions of other courts. In doing so, the Supreme 
Court is in a position to warn other constitutional courts of the 
dangers of overreliance on comparative constitutional analysis. The 
 
 119. See, e.g., South Africa Constitutional Court decisions, at http://www.concourt.gov.za/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2003); High Court of Australia decisions, at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
cases/cth/high_ct; (last visited Mar. 23, 2003); The Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan Republic 
decisions, at http://www.constitutional-court-az.org/decisions.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2003). 
 120. Barak, supra note 91, at 114. 
 121. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/11
p229 Moon note book pages.doc  4/10/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Comparative Law in Constitutional Courts 247 
 
 
Supreme Court should lead by example and show the world’s 
constitutional courts where that line needs to be drawn. 
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